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Introduction
The International Space Welding Experiment (ISWE) is a joint venture between the
E.O. Paton Welding Institute (PWI) of Kiev, Ukraine and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) of the United States government. Its purpose is to
evaluate the Ukrainian developed Universal electron beam welding system as a
contingency repair system for the International Space Station (ISS) and to provide the
capability for long term maintenance of space structures, including debris impacts to
habitable modules and repairs of fluid line leaks (Rainwater 1995).Figure 1depicts the
current configuration of the ISWE.
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Figure 1. Current ISWE Configuration

PWI has produced the Universal welding system and supporting equipment and

NASA is providing the vehicle, the space shuttle, the MPESS carrier, interface
hardware, as well as engineering support at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in
Huntsville, Alabama. Under the current flight program ISWE will be evaluated on the
space shuttle mission STS87 in October of 1997 as a part of the USMP-4 payload,
shown in figure 2. Table 1illustrates the different components of the ISWE as well as
their provider and function.
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Figure 2. The Fourth United States Microgravity Payload
With the introduction of an international partner several issues have arisen as to the

way in which the experiment will be qualified as a flyable system aboard another
agency's space vehicle. These issues are primarily due to the distinctly different
technical standards and practices that NASA and PWI use in their respective space
businesses, but issues of interagency communication and trust have also arisen.

I

Together, these issues have sigruficantly complicated what began as a small scale pilot
project in international space cooperation. With other international projects likely in the
future, it is imperative that a consensus of standards and practices for international
cooperation be established for the 21st century and beyond.

This paper highlights the various areas of concern as they have occurred over the
history of the ISWE. The history of space welding and ISWE is first presented. In the
next section a discussion of some general problems such as the communication barrier
is presented. Specific technical problems that arose during one of ISWE's reviews are

presented in the third section. Safety concerns are reviewed and highlighted in section
four. The final section suggests the idea of an international conference where all of the
space faring nations would meet to discuss the standardization of quahfying payloads
for space flight.

Together, these issues have sigruficantly complicated what began as a small scale pilot
project in international space cooperation. With other international projects likely in the
future, it is imperative that a consensus of standards and practices for international
cooperation be established for the 21st century and beyond.

This paper highlights the various areas of concern as they have occurred over the
history of the ISWE. The history of space welding and ISWE is first presented. In the
next section a discussion of some general problems such as the communication barrier
is presented. Specific technical problems that arose during one of ISWE's reviews are

presented in the third section. Safety concerns are reviewed and highlighted in section
four. The final section suggests the idea of an international conference where all of the
space faring nations would meet to discuss the standardization of quahfying payloads
for space flight.

Table 1. Components of ISWE
Component

Name

Provider

Function
To protect the orbiter and the rest of the USMP-4
experiments from contamination of the welding
particles and impingment of the electron beam

Power
Inteface
Box (PIB)

'

Provides the following: electrical isolation from
transients and noise to (or from) the TB, adds a
third inhibit to guard against failues that could
result in beam on condition
Provides signal splitting and conditioning to
interface TB telemetry with the Spacelab and
Orbiter data handling systems

1

C
?P
);:;

1 1

MSFC

1

PWI

Provides EVA controls/feedback for:
TB main power on/off, setting of beam power
modes, and setting of filler wire feed rate
---

Cable
Stowage
Devices
(csD)
Rotating
Sample

PWI

PWI

-

Provides stowage for tool cables during launch/
landing & when not in use during operations

Structure which allows the drum mounted samplc
plates/samples to be manually rotated in front of
the welder for ease of processing
- -

PWI

Provides translation capability across the ISWE
worksite with the astronaut secured in a standard
PFR bootplate. Made up of the following: SFRTrolley, SFR-Rail, SFR-T launch lock
Main power source and controller for the
Universal welding system
Provides IVA controls/feedback for:
viewing telemetry from TB,TB main power off,
TB main power on, cathode select, and beam test
start

@

Ez?Tl
athode Alignmei

PWI

5 modular hand-held electron beam welding
tools; 1Standard Tool (ST)- welding, cutting,
brazing, 3 Filler Tools (FT) -filler welding,
1Coating Tool (CT) -coaZng

Provides the following: stowage for tools during
launch/landing & when not in use by the
astronaut, on-orbit alignment of filler wire feed
mechanism to electrode beam if cathode changed

Section 1: Background
In this section the concept of welding in space is discussed. A historical look at

space welding and the political foundation of EWE is also presented as well as an
EWE experiment overview. This background includes a description of the process for
quahfying ISWE to fly on the U.S. space shuttle.

Why Weld in Space?
In addition to initial construction tasks, long term operations in space will require
performance of maintenance tasks such as repair of micrometeroid damage, leaking
fluid lines, stuck instruments, contaminated surfaces, etc. These tasks will require
welding or the development of alternative processes. Currently, space welding is
considered a high risk endeavor due to unknowns about operational characteristics of
such a process in the microgravity of space. Therefore, it is imperative that welding
equipment and procedures be demonstrated in the space environment before welding
operations can be included in the repertoire of routine space technology. With a metals
processing system qualified for assembly, construction or processing of hardware in
space and knowing appropriate welding techniques, restrictions, and weld properties,
the aerospace design community can design for welding in space (Russell, et al. 1996).

History of Space Welding
Welding in space is not a revolutionary concept. Since the 1960's the former
4.

U.S.S.R. and the United States have been conducting experiments in space welding. In
1969 the "Vdkan" automatic welder was launched on Soyuz 6 to compare three types

of welding for potential space application: electron beam, low-pressure constricted
plasma jet, and consumable electrode. As a result of the Vulkan project, the Soviet

space program (including the Ukrainians at the time) concluded that electron beam
welding was the most promising for space welding process due to its versatility and
low power consumption.
Throughout the next two decades, the USSR continued to demonstrate electron
beam welding in space. The "Isparitel"was developed by the PWI, and was launched to
the Salyut-6 space station in 1979 to test production of vapor deposited coatings.
Isparitel used an electron beam to heat the coating materials, causing them to
evaporate. The vapor was condensed on multiple substrates, both metallic and nonmetallic. Over two hundred samples of widely varying coatings were produced with

this hardware during its three years aboard Salyut-6. An improved unit, Isparitel M,
was developed and launched to the Salyut-7 space station in 1983. Tin-silver brazing
alloys, and silver-germanium eutectic alloys, were among the samples processed the
following year. The PWI also developed the "Yantar"unit which was launched to the
Mir space station in 1988. This hardware used an electron beam to produce vapor
deposited coatings on both metallic and polymeric substrates, and also allowed
welding of very thin metallic specimens. This unit, like all of the preceding units
mentioned above, was automated and therefore only produced samples where the
parameters were well known and easily preset.
In an effort to provide a more flexible tool, the PWI developed the Universal Hand
Tool (UHT) which was launched to the Salyut-7 space station in 1984. The UHT
A

consisted of a power control electronics module and hand held electron beam gun. The
0.75 kilowatt (kW)UHT was first used to conduct Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA)

welding aboard Salyut-7 in July of 1984. The EVA lasted for just over three hours and
involved two cosmonauts each performing a variety of welding, cutting, brazing, and

coating operations with the UHT. This EVA was performed with ambient lighting, and
required approximately 3 months of crew training. The UHT electronics module and
hand held electron beam welding gun were mounted to the exterior of the Salyut-7
station at the start of the EVA, prior to beginning the welding operations. Additional
experiments aboard Salyut-7 were conducted in 1986 and involved welding truss
structures and structural subassemblies representative of space station components.
The UHT hardware had been in space since the initial testing done in 1984, and
functioned flawlessly. A modified version of this 1984 UHT model, the "Universal
welding system", was chosen for the ISWE project.
The United States began welding in space in 1973 on board Skylab 3 utilizing the
electron beam concept. With the M512 astronauts on board Skylab demonstrated the
capability to repair structures in space that had been exposed for long durations.
Skylab's demise removed the need for a space welding capability and further U.S.
research was halted.
History of ISWE
As design, construction, and maintenance plans were developed for the
International Space Station (ISS), it became apparent that the need to weld in space
was inevitable. But, since the last U.S. demonstration of welding was the 1973 flight of
the M512, the NASA engineers felt that an operational system could not be developed
in the short-term ISS schedule (and within allowable cost). Furthermore, with the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, various Russian technologies (such as the
~ k v e r s awelding
l
system) and experience were becoming available to overseas
countries. Prompted by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, NASA, the PWI and the
Clinton administration's desire for cooperative space ventures with the former Soviet
states, the United States and the Paton Welding Institute began active negotiations to

transfer the UHT technology the U.S. This process, summarized in table 2, resulted in
the development of the ISWE.
Table 2. Steps Toward ISWE Creation
Date
1992-1993
April 1993
September
1993
October 1993
November
1993
January 1994
March 1994
July 1994

Occurrence
McDonnell Douglas Corporation and Ukrainians test UHT
workstation in Neutral Buoyancy Simulator (NBS) tank
Fourth Call for Flight Demonstrations from NASA Headquarters
Space Act Agreement between MSFC & PWI - 1st project with the
Ukrainians and MSFC - conduct demonstration of UHT on KC-135
Ukrainians arrive for preparation of tests
ISWE picked for further study as possible demonstration on
shuttle
KC-135 flight
130-150 welds processed
President Bill Clinton goes to the Ukraine - talks of cooperation in
space between the two nations
Delegation from the National Space Agency of the Ukraine meets
at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. - 1997 flight
demonstration of the UHT discussed

ISWE Experiment Overview

The ISWE will involve a single, two person EVA with a third IVA crewmember in
support at the aft flight deck. The heart of the ISWE is the Universal Welding System
( W S ) . The W S is a hand-held electron beam welding gun with specialized
attachments, and integral cable for connection to the Technological Block (TB). The
electron beam is produced by heating a metal filament within the cathode to produce
electrons which are then accelerated by the potential difference between the cathode and
anode, and focused by the anode configuration. The power cable feeds into the tool
through the base of the handle. The tools are designed to accept different kinds of
attachments which allow the operator to perform different operations, including
welding, brazing, and vapor deposition. Although the welding tools are designed for
use as modular units, five electron beam tools are planned for use on this flight so that
no on-orbit tool reconfiguration is necessary. The tools will simply be exchanged for the

different tasks. Exchanging the welding guns will require removing power,
disconnecting the integral power cable from the TB, and connecting the power cable for
the new tool. The power cable connection is identical for each tool. Each electron beam
tool is between 4.5 and 6.5 kg, including the integral cable, depending on the
configuration. Each tool is equipped with a pair of green LEDs on the upper sides of
the tool which indicate operation. All of the crew interface labels will be in English and
Russian.
The five tools to be flown include a standard tool (ST) for general purpose
welding/brazing/cutting, three for welding with filler wire, and one for coating by
vapor deposition. The 4.5 kg. ST is designed to weld aluminum, stainless steel, and
titanium samples up to 2 mm thick, and cut samples up to 1.5 mm. The filler wire
feed tools (each 6.5 kg.) include one with 2319 aluminum filler wire, one with 5356
aluminum filler wire, and one with 308 stainless steel filler wire. The 2319 filler wire is
intended for use on 2219 aluminum samples. The 5356 filler wire is intended for use on
5456 aluminum samples. The filler wire will be fed at a fixed rate from a motorized
spool attached to the side of the head. The filler wire is necessary for welds where the
joint is not very tight. It is also necessary for all welds of 5456 aluminum as this alloy
will crack without filler wire. The motorized spools will dispense the filler wire at 10 to

15 millimeters per second. Power for the spool motor is provided by the electron beam
tool.
The experiment sample materials will include 2219 aluminum from which the

U.S.,Japanese, and European space station modules will be made, 5356 aluminum
from which the Russian modules are made, 304 stainless steel, and T i - 6 A I 4 titanium
alloy. The welds will be performed at a rate determined by ground testing at MSFC.
The coating experiments will involve the application of three optical coatings. The

magnesium fluoride (MgF2),silver (Ag) and gold (Au) will be applied to the silica
glass substrates with the vapor deposition gun. The coating experiments will include
three fixtures, each containing one inch diameter circular substrates. The coatings will
be applied until they are visibly opaque, roughly just over one thousand angstroms
thick.

ISWE Development

When an experiment has been chosen by NASA to fly on board the space shuttle the
payload must go through a process to qu*

its design and fabrication as flight-ready

hardware. A standard development process is shown in Figure 3. As shown in Figure
4, ISWE's development process differs from the standard due to the additional UHT
review. Since the UWS was an existing design by PWI, the UHT review allowed NASA
to evaluate the design in terms of safety and interfaces.
Program
Development

,

Project
Requirements Review

b-

Preliminary
Design Review

Critical Design
Review

Figure 3. Standard Process for Payload Design Acceptance

-

Program
ATP

Universal Hand
Tool Review
February 13 - March 28. 1995

Project
Requirements Review April 27 - May 26. 1995

v
Preliminary
Design Review
August 28 - September 26,1995

Critical Design
Review
April 17 -May 10, 1996

Figure 4. EWE'S Design Acceptance Process

During each EWE review, issues arose due to the difference in standards and
practices between NASA and PWI. For each issue, engineers at both the Marshall
Space Flight Center and the Paton Welding Institute had to devise a solution that
would minimize cost and schedule impact without jeopardizing safety of the astronaut
crew or the orbiter. This paper details each design review and discusses the problems
that occurred as well as the solutions that were devised by the EWE team. Although
many of the concerns initially seem small, they were amplified due to the philosophical
differences of Russia and the U.S. in quahfying a payload to fly into space.

Section 2: General Problems
Several general problems that have plagued EWE during the entire qualification
process. These include: language barrier, trust, and analysis verses testing.

Language Barrier
With any effort being undertaken by an international partners that speak different
languages, problems are inherently possible and probable. With ISWE's partner being
the Paton Welding Institute in Kiev, Ukraine, translators were required to speak
between the two centers to enable the engineers to understand each other. A telecon
was set for every Thursday morning at 8:00 am Marshall time (400 pm Kiev t h e ) to
discuss any problems of the week and to generally touch base with the other engineers.
These conversations/telecons took twice as long because of translation between the two
parties. But, there was still a risk of misinterpretation/mistranslationinvolved.
Therefore, any agreements made during these telecons were usually written down and
faxed or mailed to the other center to make sure the two sides were in total agreement.
But, when those faxes or letters arrived, they would have to be translated often causing
an additional delay of several days. Over time both sides mutually adapted to this
situation. As the program progressed, U.S.engineers began to understand the
Ukrainians in their native language, with out the aid of the translators. Even more
interesting was the fact that the Ukrainians began to speak English in a way which was
easily understood by the MSFC engineers. The Ukrainians seemed to enjoy learning to
speak English and being able to talk to the MSFC engineers in their native tongue. A
lesson should be learned here. The Ukrainians each made an honest effort to learn our
language and did not make us learn theirs. While NASA gave the ISWE engineers the
opportunity to take classes to learn the Ukrainian language, many did not make the
time to take them. NASA should encourage and, in some cases, require the engineers
with international projects to take classes to be able to better communicate with their
foreign counterparts. This action, while small in stature, would have shown the

Ukrainians a general interest in their culture and their language, making them feel a
more integrated part of the ISWE team.

Trust
The U.S. and the former Soviet states have long been rivals in the space arena, each
vying to be the preeminent space power of earth. It is this rivalry that led to the
creation of both NASA and PWI. Yet, with ISWE, both of these agencies were to
become partners to achieve one common goal. Decades of rivalry had to be put aside
to reach the completion of ISWE. Naturally, in the beginning their was not much trust
on the part of either party.
Initially, the Ukrainians were hesitant to disclose information vital to the integration
and qualification of the Universal hardware. Not being under military control, the
Ukrainians were concerned that the information provided to NASA would become
public domain and could therefore be taken by any interested American company. This
false perception was allayed by conveying to the Ukrainians the content of Public Law
#18-1905, "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any
department or agency there of, ...publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any
manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him or in the
course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or
investigation ... shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment." Under this law the
b a i n i a n hardware was labeled proprietary information, thereby protecting it from the
American public. This action, in turn, gave Paton the confidence with which to proceed
with the disclosure of their design.

Having taken this first step, the Ukrainians and NASA were now able to work more
closely knowing that the other would secure their information. Trust is a vital part of
cooperation that must be firmly in place if the space faring nations wish to effectively
work with one another. ISWE can serve as a model of such cooperation. NASA and
PWI both went through a time of building a working relationship of openness and
trust. With this in place, future cooperative ventures with PWI will run more smoothly.

Analysis vs. Test
The UHT review brought out a major difference between NASA and PWI's
approach to hardware development. For several decades NASA has moved toward
more emphasis on computer analysis of designs and less dependence on actual testing.

This method has continued to prove effective and cost efficient. However, the former
Soviet Union states have a very different philosophy. They believe in overdesigning a
system and then testing it to its limits. This approach is initially more costly because
two complete systems must be manufactured as well as the risk that the design fails to
meet criteria and must be redesigned. The analysis method minimizes the risk to the
project and maintains the life of the hardware. But, the analysis approach has its
downfalls as well. Computational analysis cannot fully simulate the true environments
that the hardware will be subjected to in space. If any design shortcoming appears
after the system is on orbit, it is often too late and failures occur. There is a middle
ground for hardware development. Performing some level of initial analyses to
confirm the design's requirements are met and then testing to validate (or benchmark)
the analysis, the hardware can prove qualification. With ISWE, several analyses were
done as well as tests to validate the analyses.

Because of the lack reliance on analysis and the fact that the UWS was designed as
a portable unit that the Russians launched inside the crew cabin and transported
outside to perform operations, it was decided that MSFC would do the analytical work
of the qualification program. NASA has a specific analysis protocol that must be
performed in order to quahfy a payload to fly on the shuttle. This protocol is
summarized in Table 3 along with the source document that requires them
Table 3. Required NASA Analyses and their Sources
Analysis
Thermal
Stress
Dynamic
Human Factors
Fracture
Materials
Venting
Static Envelope

Source
SLPl2104-10, Appendix K
JA-081, JA-2294, NSTS 21000-IDD-MDK
JA-081, JA-2294
NASA-STD-3000, JSC 26626A
JA-081, JA-276, NSTS 21000-IDD-MDK
JA-081
JA-081, ICD-2-19001, SLP/2104 Main
Volume
ICD-B-MPESS-AIMPESS-B, NSTS 21000IDD-MDK, JA-2294

Once these analyses are performed, the hardware is then subjected to the flight
environments in ground tests that the analyses predict that they will see. By passing
these tests the hardware is qualified to fly. From a safety standpoint, allowing
Marshall to do these analyses gave the ISWE a more documented record of the payload

satisfying the requirements imposed on it.

Section 3: Specific Problems

This section discusses the technical issues that arose during one or several of the
ISWE reviews as well as the solutions that the team decided and fixes. This section
also includes a discussion of the lessons learned from these issues.

NBS Lubricant

When a project involves extra-vehicular activity (EVA), Neutral Buoyancy
Simulation (NBS) testing is recommended. By conducting NBS testing, astronauts as
well as the experiment's engineering team can evaluate the compatibility of the
experiment equipment with the astronaut. Since the EWE calls for a six hour EVA to
conduct the welding operation, a test was run to determine the crew interfaces
acceptability. NBS testing means that moving parts within the experiment must have
water-compatible lubricant. The lubricant that PWI was going to provide did not have
a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) which is required to assure no toxicity concerns
exist when put in the water. Therefore, MSFC had to provide the NASA approved
standard lubricants to PWI so they could be incorporated before the NBS hardware
was shipped from Kiev to Huntsville.

Push-In-Place (PIP) Pins
During Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) operations, the astronaut crew will be
required to unstow and restow hardware and tools required for welding. To make sure
the items do not move until needed, PIP pins are installed. Tests to insure hardware
immobility with the PIP pins are required by NASA.
The PWI designed SFR-T stowage mechanism provided immobility through friction.

This was considered unacceptable by NASA/MSFC. Paton reevaluated its design and
provided NASA/MSFC with a new clamp design utilizing T-handle, single action,
tether captive PIP pins. This was acceptable to NASA/MSFC but not to NASA/JSC.
Since EWE requires an EVA, the JSC EVA and astronaut offices take priority on the
EVA part of the experiment. According to the astronaut office the two PIP pins
preferred and strongly recommended were the Ringed PIP pin and the T-handle PIP

pin, with the Ringed version preferred just slightly over the T-handle version (Finney
and Gibson 1993). Also, both of those pins were double-action, not single. While
PWI's design did include PIP pins that were tethered, it was the opinion of JSC that the
PIP pins should be self-aligning with the hole as well as retained.
Therefore, MSFC and PWI had to make further changes to meet the
recommendations of JSC and the astronaut office. As a consequence, MSFC provided
PWI the correct PIP pins to install into their hardware. Even without the last changes,
MSFC would have had to provide the PIP pins anyway to meet NASA requirements.
The PIP pin problem should never have been an issue after the first redesign. NASA
should have one standard that is followed by all the centers to alleviate any confusion
and redesign efforts. It is hard enough for NASA and U.S. contractors to understand
all of these different center accepted standards, let alone a foreign partner such as PWI.

Fasteners
Upon review of the ISWE design at PDR it was determined that all of the fasteners
on the PWI hardware of the ISWE would not meet NASA requirements for several
reasons:
1) There was no fastener preload indicated in the PWI drawings. Further

investigation revealed that PWI does not apply preload in fasteners. It is standard U.S.
aerospace industry practice to apply preloads to all fasteners loaded in tension. Both
MSFC-STD-486 and NSTS 08307 suggest that it is standard practice for NASA flight
hardware (at both MSFC and for the NSTS) to have nonzero preloads applied to all
fasteners (Denniston 1995).
2) Many of the PWI hardware drawings called for a common Russian practice of

securing all fasteners at final assembly with epoxy putty. MSFC-STD-561A allows

thread lock compound for redundant fasteners only, and calls for fasteners which
secure rotating devices to be safety wired/cabled or pinned (Denniston 1995).
There are two reasons why it is desirable to apply preloads to the hardware's
threaded fasteners. First of all, a preload on a threaded fastener works to keep the
joint's various members aligned. The clamping force produces increased friction to
resist the relative sliding of joint components. Secondly, a preload applied to a
threaded fastener also improves a joint's capability to respond to externally applied
loads. It does so by channeling most of this externally applied load from the fastener
itself into the surrounding joint.
The proper alignment of threaded fastener joints is very important. If the fastener
head or nut becomes skewed (as shown in Figure 5) by even a few degrees, the joint can
lose a si@cant

amount of its load carrying capability because of less bearing surface.

Also, preloads on threaded fasteners act as springs to pull various members of a joint
back into their proper position. If various parts of a joint become misaligned, sharp
corners can become exposed, posing a potential hazard to the crew. Finally, the
dynamic operation of various ISWE hardware may be adversely affected by
misalignment due to a lack of a preload on threaded fasteners. For instance, the axles
about which the rotating sample holder rotates are attached with threaded fasteners. If
these axles get out of alignment, then the sample holder may not rotate. If the Tool
Stowage Assembly (TSA) structure shifts, it may prove difficult to remove or replace
the UWSs. The SFR system may also be susceptible to functional failure due to joint
misalignment.

Figure 5. Illustration of Fastener Misalignment

As alluded to earlier, an applied preload can also assist a threaded fastener with
reacting externally applied loads. Consider Figure 6 which illustrates the case where
there is not enough preload in the bolt to prevent the flanges from prying apart and the
bolt bends in an eccentric joint.

Figure 6. Example of Bolt Deformation with Joint Separation

Assuming Q=0; (i.e., there is no contact at the outer edge of the flange), The bolt shown
is bent by the moment:

The bolt must handle this bending moment in addition to the tensile load "F," induced
by the externally applied load "F". When a preload is applied to the bolt of sufficient
magnitude, the flanges remain in contact and the bolt is no longer required to read the
bending moment "MM;' by itself. The moment "M~I;' is now reacted by the load
couple " Q and "F,". In addition to the fastener no longer being bent, it now reacts
only a portion of the external load. Most of the external load is no longer trying to
stretch the bolt. The external load is now working to pull the flanges apart. It is true
that a preload will add tensile loading to the bolt. However, that applied preload will
not likely load the bolt as severely (even when working in conjunction with the external
load "F") as the bolt would be loaded by the additional bending moment "Mblt".
(Denniston 1995).
To solve this preload issue, a procedure developed by Marshall and approved by
PWI, was introduced to determine the fastener preloads. Figure 7 shows the flow of
work for establishing the fastener preloads. Note the complex set of decisions and
actions required to recidy a basic issue of nonsimilar design practices. MSFC ended up
doing torque tension testing on fastener and joint configurations representative of those
found in the PWI hardware. MSFC also provided PWI with fastener and tooling
(torque wrenches) to install the fasteners with the test determined pre-loads. MSFC
also supplied thread locking compound (loctite) identical to that used in the testing so
that a l l parameters remained the same as ip testing.
Only threaded fasteners determined to be fracture-critical have to be secured by a
positive locking device, per MSFC-STD-561A. A fracture analysis of all PWI hardware
determined that there were no fracture-critical fasteners and the use of thread locking

compound would be acceptable in all but one application. The fasteners that secure
the RSH bearings had to be modified (drilled heads) so that lock wire could be used.
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Figure 7. Flow of Work for Establishing Fastener Preloads
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Materials
From the beginning of ISWE, materials were of great concern. During the UHT
review, several Review Item Discrepancies (RIDS)were written against the design due
to the differences between material characterization of the two agencies. Examples of
the type of materials issues raised during the review are as follows:
1) All hardware located in the cargo bay of the orbiter is subject to contamination
by thermally induced vacuum outgassing. There was no data to support that this is a
common practice of PWI (Landers 1995).
2) No materials list was provided for the power cables, so the acceptability for use

on the shuttle could determined (Landers 1995).
3) All materials listed in the drawing packages referred to GOST standards, but

did not contain them. To evaluate materials of construction in a stress analysis the
GOST standards and material properties of the various materials were needed
(Landers 1995).
The solutions to these problems proved to be very creative on the part of the
Materials and Processes Laboratory as well as the entire ISWE team.
1) Hardware located in the cargo bay of the orbiter is subject to the thermal
vacuum stability requirements of JSC-SP-R-0022. It was agreed that all of the
hardware located in the cargo bay must go through a thermal bakeout period on the
ground. By thermally baking the component, any impurity or residue will be offgassed
before the component is flown on the shuttle. If this procedure is not carried out the
shuttle's radiators could be contaminated or damaged. As a result, the ISWE team
decided to conduct the thermal bakeout at Marshall with PWI supervising the process
as well as agreeing to the temperatures the components would be baked (10°C greater
than expected maximum on-orbit).

2) The ISWE team decided to manufacture all flight cables except the UWS cables

at Marshall to alleviate any questions from the material's experts about their
composition.
3) To cerbEy the material properties of the Ukrainian built components, the

Materials and Processes Laboratory used the same procedure they had used with
Russian built components. PWI provided the information from the GOST standards to
the Materials and Processes Laboratory which then made an in-depth analysis of the
material (i.e., chemical, physical properties, etc.). Rather than examine the multitude of
different materials in the system, the most commonly used ten alloys were selected
and compared to their U.S. equivalent to determine the accuracy of the PWI supplied
GOST standards. As shown in Table 4, the test set is made up of 28 different materials
containing different GOST standards. Table 5 shows an example of the analysis
including composition, yield stress, and ultimate stress. As a result of the analysis,
eight of the ten alloys appeared to have mechanical properties that were similar to their

USA equivalents. To provide a confidence level in the other alloys, the annealed
properties were used. With this work complete, the stress analysis could be done with
a high degree of confidence in the results.

Table 4. Test Set Materials

Fiber glass laminate ST 0.5 (1.5.3)
Fiber glass laminate STEF 1(1.5,10)
Glass TOSP 2, colouless transparent
Lacquer UR-231
Petrol B-70
Plate of AMg3 16
Plate of D 16 25
Primer AK-070
Rectified ethyl alcohol
Rod of D16TK R5O-ND
Sheet of AMg3 0.8 (1,1.5,2,3)
Sheet of AMg3 (16)
Sheet of AMtsM
Sheet of Dl6 1 (3,5,10)
Solder POS 61
STEEL 20Kh 13
Tape LV-40-230-10~0.65 white
Tape PVKh 15~0.20lgiht blue grade 1
Tube 3.31TV-40
Varnished insulating fabric LShMS-105
0.10
Wire MGTF 0.25

GOST 12652-74
GOST 12652-74
GOST 12622-72
TU 6-10-863-76, Ozhch
GOST 1012-72
GOST 17232-79
GOST 17232-79
OST 6-10-401-76
GOST 18300-72
GOST 21488-76
GOST 21631-76
GOST 21631-76
GOST 21631-76
GOST 21631-76
GOST 21931-76
GOST 5632-72
STP.EE.53-81
GOST 16214-70
GOST 19034-82
GOST 2214-78
TU 16-505.185-71

Table 5. An example of the Material's Analysis
Ukrainian

U.S.

EW m g
5
Mg 4.7-5.7

r-rate
- x&

Mn 0.2-

Cu 0.2 mx

Fe&Si 0.4 mx
each
Ni 0.1 mx

UTS (ksi)
34

YSI (ksi)
21

% Elong

5456
Mg 4.7-5.5 Fe 0.4 rnx Si 0.25 mx

0.6

M n 0.5-1.0

Cr 0.050.2

Zn 0.25
mx

Ti 0.2
mx

UTS (ksi) YS (ksi) % Elong
45
24
23
45
22
24
51
37
16
51
16
37

-

23

5456-0
5456-HI12
5456-H321
5456-HI16

EM1 Testing

Within NASA there are several requirements for conducting EMI tests. To fly on the
shuttle, ICD-2-19001 states that the payload must provide documentation to prove
compliance. This documentation takes the form of an EMI test report. E M testing
became a factor from the very start of the ISWE project. During the UHT review, it
was determined that the UWS was susceptible to the power bus voltage ripples and
transients that are present on the orbiter's power bus (Clark 1995). This could have
caused conducted interference and damage to the UWS hardware during on-orbit
operations. Also, it was found that the UWS could interfere with the Extra Mobility
Unit (EMU) radio. This posed great concern for the crew to be able to communicate
with one another.
The Ukrainians have never performed EMI testing. EMI apparently was not a
concern when the equipment was flown in the Soviet system. Conversely, NASA has
governing, established requirements, especially in areas such as EMI, for tests of each

unit, and then integration into the system. Because of these different philosophies,
resultant designs are quite different. Generally, Ukrainian hardware is simple, rugged
as well as overdesigned. American hardware is sophisticated and closer on margins.
By being more sophisticated, American hardware can also often have more things to go
wrong.
Another source of EMI problems was due to the differences in U.S. and Russian
power buses. Aboard the space station MIR the Ukrainians/Russians utilize a vehicle
power bus and a scientific power bus. The vehicle bus allows the normal operations of
the space station without interfering with the experiments powered through the
scientific bus. However, on the shuttle there are three redundant power buses, each
supplying power to both payloads and the shuttle itself. The Ukrainians had not
previously had to deal with EMI problems in their bus architecture.
To fix the interference with the EMU radio, PWI added a zip shield and a line filter
supplied by NASA to each tool. Also, a filter, called the Power Interface Box (PIB), was
designed and built to prevent noise from the orbiter power bus from being transmitted
to ISWE. In addition, the PIB isolates the shuttle's power systems much like the
Russians do on the M R .

Temperaturephermal
As with EMI testing, standards for temperature calculation and thermal analysis
proved to be based on totally different philosophies in NASA verses PWI. The Shuttle
Payloads Accommodations Handbook (SPAH, Appendix K) specifies that a thermal
analysis must be performed to define the maximum on-orbit temperature expected.
The components must then be tested at a level 10°F (5OC) above this temperature. The
first thermal issue arose from the differences in the definition of temperatures. NASA

has several different temperature categories: operational, non-operational, and
survival. The corresponding range for each of these temperatures must be specified for
each component. The Ukrainians had only one set of temperatures which were
assumed to be the operating temperatures. The Ukrainians had never heard of nonoperating and survival temperatures. Their philosophy is to design each component
robust and durable enough to operate over a wide range of temperatures.
Since the UHT was designed as a portable unit and the EWE would launch the
UWS in the cargo bay, it had never been subjected to the temperature extremes that the

ISWE would undergo. Also, since the ISWE required an EVA, another set of
temperatures had to be determined to evaluate the touch temperature extremes for the
front and palm of the EMU gloves. To address both of these issues, a thermal model
was developed using the orbiter attitude predicted during the mission to calculate the
maximum temperatures that the EWE would see on orbit. Utilizing these predicted
temperatures, several tests were conducted to validate the hardware to those
temperature limits or design operational work around which would maintain the
Universal within its required temperature limits.
In addition, the operating temperatures supplied to MSFC by PWI were specified at
the component level. At NASA, the temperatures are calculated as wall temperatures
on the outside of the boxes. Without more information, the MSFC engineers could not
relate the wall temperatures to the component temperatures to determine if the boxes
could survive. To solve this issue, the ISWE team decided to perform a development
test on the PWI hardware to determine the relationship between the wall and
component temperatures. In addition to the development test, the PWI hardware will
be subjected to the tests described below as part of the final hardware qualification.

Figure 8 depicts the hardware configuration during the thermal vacuum test. The
items pictured will be subjected to hot and cold temperature cycling under vacuum
conditions concurrent with functional operation of the electronic components to ensure
hardware operation under mission environment conditions. Figure 9 depicts the
hardware that will undergo thermal cycling. The items pictured will be subjected to hot
and cold temperature cycling concurrent with functional operation of the electronic
components to detect materials and workmanship defects and as an electronic
functional screening test prior to the thermal vacuum testing. This test will be
conducted at ambient pressure. The tools will be subjected to the same two tests as
shown in Figures 10 and 11,but will not be functioned in either. Figure 12 shows the
hardware configuration for the thermal mechanisms test. The items will be subjected to
hot and cold predicted on-orbit operational temperate extremes within a man rated
chamber. This test will provide assurance that the mechanisms operate as designed
without interference or binding at temperature extremes plus margin. The test items
will be functionally operated at ambient temperature and the chamber temperature
then raised to a higher temperature based on the thermal analysis of the hardware for
the flight conditions. A suited person will enter the chamber and actuate the hardware
mechanisms. This series will then be repeated with the chamber temperature being
lowered to a cold temperature and then returned to ambient and the mechanisms reactuated. Limits of travel, mechanical tension criteria and mechanical release criteria
are just some of the functions that will be verified during functional testing of the
mechanisms.

Thermal Vacuum Test
Thermal Vacuum Chamber (Sunspot)

TEST CRITERIA:
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c 10-5 Ton Vacuum
Max Predicted Temperature
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Figure 8. Thermal Vacuum Test

Thermal Cycle Test
Thermal Chamber
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C
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Figure 9. Thermal Cycle Test
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Figure 10. Tool Thermal Cycle Test
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Figure 11. Tool Thermal Vacuum Test
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Figure 12. Thermal Mechanisms Test
As mentioned earlier, the tools will undergo two thermal cycle tests to completely verlfy
the design. The first test is designed as a check or screening before the thermal vacuum
test to pinpoint any workmanship problems in the design. The Ukrainians believed that
eight cycles in the thermal cycle test and eight cycles in the thermal vacuum test were
too much on the tools. However, this level of testing is required to completely verlfy an
existing design that NASA/MSFC has not had prior experience with. The thermal
vacuum chamber is very expensive and complicated to operate. Therefore you want to
know the hardware being placed in the chamber is free from any material and
,..
workmanship defects.

It was decided that the tools would undergo the two tests as well as the other
components undergoing the other tests. It is very interesting to see that the two

agencies would do things just a little bit different, but because of that tiny difference,
sigruficant issues could arise.

Test Procedures
To test and qu-

a piece of hardware at MSFC, a procedure must be written to

document the work to be done by a qualified test engineer. ISWE'S hardware had to
undergo this type of plan as well. A discrepancy was discovered during conversations
between the MSFC test engineers and the PWI engineers. At MSFC if a piece of
hardware must be changed out or reconfigured for another test, a procedure must be
written to do that hardware change. If this is not written and the change is made, all
prior tests done are invalidated because the flight hardware configuration has been
altered. In the case of ISWE, there were four such instances.
1) The cathode inside the UWS can be used up during the qualification tests and might
need to be removed and a new one installed. Each cathode has a useful life of one hour
and their are two cathodes per tool.
2) The filler wire inside the Filler Wire Tool might need to be changed or a new wire

added.
3) The Coating Tool's crucibles and turret head might have to be removed and a new

one installed.
4) The Technological Block would possibly need to be re-pressurized at Kennedy Space

Center (KSC) or MSFC.
When the ~krainia&tested their hardware and a part had to be changed they just
added a line to the test procedure saying that one of the engineers would change the
part. No documented procedure on how to change the part was written. When MSFC
told PWI that they would have to write these plans, PWI was surprised. They had

never had to do this before. It seems hard to believe that they could say that their
hardware, after being changed with a procedure they had in their head, was still the
same. Only standardized documented procedures provide a level of assurance.
After some discussion with PWI about this issue, they agreed to document their
procedures for these four events. It is hoped that they realize the benefit of
documenting their flight configuration so as to truly qu*

it according to NASA

standards.

Section 4: Safety

Risk is inherent in any space venture. When man is involved in the venture, the
safety measures required to mitigate the risk increase tremendously. Within NASA, a
Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) managed by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in
Houston, Texas oversees every project's safety compliance to fly on board the shuttle.

This panel reviews the project's safety with respect to NASA requirements and
provides feedback to the project team to help them comply. This panel meets at
different times during the payload's development cycle to ensure a safe flight system is
being repaired. These meetings are a Phase 011 review, a Phase 2 review, and a Phase

3 review. With EWE being such a complex and potentially "hazardous" system, the
safety panel met several times during the Phase 0/1 review to completely v e d y the
safety of the ISWE. Figure 4 shows several meetings held by the safety panel during
ISWE's review process.

In contrast, in the Ukraine there is no independent safety review commission/board.
Payload specialists conduct their own reviews after which the final solutions are
presented to the State Committee. However, the lead safety role belongs to the general

designer. IE he says yes to the risks, etc., then the whole issue is a go. The state
committee is called a "Final Safety Commission". It is essentially similar to the PSRP,
but less meticulous. Most of the discussions take place in working groups. Routinely,
the commission will have the "yes-no" approach to most problems. Normally, no more
than two to three questions for each topic are asked/answered during a session. The
meeting of the committee normally takes one day instead of many. It generates a
signature page, etc. The "Final Safety Commission" is not the same as the "State
Launch Committee". They each have different goals and tasks. Because of these
differencesin safety reviews, the following items were brought up as issues from the
PSRP.
Contamination

When an experiment is flown on the orbiter, certain precautions must be taken to
ensure the cleanliness and safety of the experiment. In the case of ISWE, the team had
to ensure that the ISWE would not contaminate the shuttle, the EVA crewman's suit,
the extra vehicular mobility unit (EMU),or other payloads.
To provide this contamination free environment, the ISWE team had to design and
manufacture several items necessary to ensure the cleanliness of the ISWE. When the
ISWE is in operation, particulates can develop that could contaminate the other
experiments in the cargo bay violating JA-081, "Payload Mission Manager S&I
Requirements Partial Payload Missions". Contamination was not an issue to the
Ukrainians because the system that flew on Salyut was mounted to the side of the
spacecraft and allowed to expel vapor into space. Contamination is also important to
the orbiter itself. If the shuttle's radiators became coated with material, they would not
be able to reject the heat produced from the shuttle's internal systems causing an

emergency de-orbit. Further, the aft flight deck windows would become covered by the
vapor deposition resulting in a safety concern for the crew. To alleviate all of these
concerns, the contamination curtain (CC) was designed and built by MSFC. Figure 13
depicts the entire ISWE with the contamination curtain highlighted. This curtain will be
launched in place to give the astronauts more time to weld on orbit.

CONDUCTIVE BETA CLOTH
SIDE CURTAIN

lSWE CARRIER

3-TRUNNION STRUCTURE

CONDUCTIVE BETA CLOTH
BULKHEAO CURTAIN

Figure 13. ISWE with Contamination Curtain

In addition, the EMU had to be protected from contamination. The EMU suits
used by NASA are not expendable and must be reused. Also, the EMU'S sensors and
life support equipment are very fragde and must be adequately protected to ensure the
safety of the astronaut. A welding cosmonaut is provided no such suit protection.

After the welding operation, the suit was used again after a damage inspection. NASA
was still insistent that the EMU be protected. JSC devised an EMU protective garment,
figure 14, that would prevent the EMU from becoming contaminated. After the
welding is complete, the astronaut takes off the protective garment and stows it in a
garment stowage bag mounted on EWE.

Figure 14. EMU Protective Suit

Further, the EMU helmet must continue to be contaminate free during welding
operations. To give the astronaut complete visibility of the weld pool, expendable
shields had to be designed to cover the visor. Once the shield becomes too
contaminated for the astronaut to see, he will replace it with a clean one. Again, the
Ukrainians did not see the value in having these shields. When they welded on Salyut,
the cosmonaut had no other means of protection other that his helmet visor. But, with
ISWE more samples are being welded and at a higher power mode, therefore, it is
expected that there will be more contamination than was experienced previously by
PWI.

Light Intensity
Another hazard is associated with the weld pool being too intense for the
astronaut's eyes. As with normal welding operations on Earth, welding in space
requires eye protection from the intense light being emitted. If there is no protection
provided, the retina in the eye would become damaged, with a resultant possible loss
of sight. The standard cosmonaut's visor is made with a high optical density material
to prevent this from happening. During their welding operations, their sun visor was
used only when the titanium sample was being welded. This sun visor was also
standard, with gold plating. The American counterpart, however, is not of the same
optical density. To alleviate this problem a visor analysis was conducted to see if the
sun visor provided on the standard EMU would be sufficient. Per Dr. Martin E.
~oleman'shemoto Mr. Curt Broussard, dated August 16,1996, '.

. .conduct of the

ISWE in the space vacuum, while wearing an EMU with the standard sun visor, will
not present an eye hazard from the bright light produced."

The above discussion is a prime example of the issues that arise during technology
transfer. The system that is transferred was designed to meet another set of criteria
and requirements. Once subjected to new criteria and requirements, obvious
discrepancies occur, some of which may be quite serious. If the same standards were
used, issues such as the one above would be resolved in a matter of minutes instead of
days, or never occur.

Fasteners
The fastener issue is another example of the situations that occur due to the
different NASA and PWI philosophies. Under normal NASA operations, fasteners are
procured from approved vendors that build fasteners to the specified requirements that
NASA imposes. The companies are randomly audited to ensure the integrity of their
fasteners. By maintaining this control, NASA/MSFC feels comfortable that the
fasteners procured are of flight quality. But, with ISWE the PWI Universal hardware
used fasteners which were manufactured by PWI. MSFC provided the workstation
fasteners.

This posed an issue to the safety panel because MSFC could not ensure the integrity
of the PWI fasteners. The PWI fasteners were manufactured to GOST standards, not
MSFC standards. If the same standards were in place there would have been no
concern. To adapt to NASA's policy, the PWI adopted a MSFC plan to ensure the
credibility of their fasteners. They would provide all technical documentation and
material traceability io personnel at MSFC for review. Further, they would also provide
samples of the fasteners for the MSFC engineers to test to verlfy the documentation and
traceability.

This action seems very demeaning and degrades the spirit of partnership required
for joint projects. The Paton Welding Institute has been building and launching space
payloads as long as NASA. It appears very egotistical and very untrustworthy of

NASA to make PWI give all of its documentation to them to review and then test it to
ensure its validity. If common standards were implemented this would not have had
to happen. NASA and PWI could both feel that the design of the ISWE was safe and
reliable from both sides.

Conclusion

The International Space Welding Experiment was designed and submitted in the
Fourth NASA Call for Flight Demonstrations. It was to demonstrate the capability of
welding in space as a possible repair scenario. Not only did it become that, but much
more. ISWE has become a demonstration of international cooperation to achieve a
common goal. It has taken once arch rivals, namely the United States and the Ukraine,
and brought them together to share their technologies and lessons learned through the
three decades these agencies have been flying into space.
For many of the engineers at Marshall as well as in the Ukraine, the experience has
brought new ways to think and new creative ways to fix the problems. Through the
entire process, all of the engineers have been shocked by how differently the two parties
work. It has been a learning experience for all.
The history of ISWE can serve as an example of the beginning of a joint space
program, where country lines have no meaning. In every instance described in this
paper, it was both the Ukrainians as well as the Americans agreeing to the decision, not
one or the other.

However, the increasing complexity of the ISWE development process should also
serve as a warning that there are not enough international standards to accommodate
payloads. For every space faring nation to have its own set of standards and yet
expect to quahfy to fly on another's vehicle is unthinkable. Practical international
standards must be established if the entire world is going into space. Projects like

ISWE and the International Space Station should serve as precursors to international
standards and practices.
Therefore, it is concluded that a conference should be held whereby all space faring
nations discuss and mutually agree to one set of international standards. If a new
nation wishes to become involved in an international space program then it too adopts
these standards. This process will bring the entire planet one step closer to conquering
the great frontier of space.
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